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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough"
Of the forty-six cases decided during the survey year, fifteen are
digested in this Article. Two custody cases are of special importance,
one dealing with application of federal law and the other with joint
custody. The remaining cases address smaller points across a familiar
judicial landscape. This Article also highlights amendments to the child
support guidelines.

I. DIVORCE
Settlement Agreements
Van Dyck v. Van Dyck 1 again occupied the appellate stage. The
Georgia Supreme Court held the trial court erred by admitting parol
evidence to contradict the language of Item 3(b) of the parties' divorce
decree.' The former husband filed a modification petition which alleged
that Item 3(b) was ambiguous on classification of payments as alimony
or child support.3 The husband argued the parties intended all
payments to be child support, and he should be allowed to present parol
evidence concerning the parties' intent. The husband further contended
his payments should terminate because one child had reached the age
of majority and the other child had elected to reside with him.4 Item
3(b) required the husband to make payments to the wife as "'alimony for
her support and the support.., of the children'."5 The court held that
parol evidence was inadmissible to prove the payments were all child

A.

* Shareholder in the firm of Frankel, Hardwick, Tanenbaum & Fink, P.C., Atlanta,
Georgia. University of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B.,

1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 263 Ga. 161, 429 S.E.2d 914 (1993).
2. Id. at 161, 429 S.E.2d at 915.

3. Id. at 162, 429 S.E.2d at 915.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 161-62, 429 S.E.2d at 915.
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support because the evidence would directly contradict the language of
Item 3(b).' The court concluded that the agreement was for the
support of the wife and the children and that it was not subject to
proration based upon contingent events concerning the children.7 The
court stated that parties to a contract are presumed to act with
knowledge of relevant laws and their effect on the subject matter of the
contract.' "Here, the agreement did not provide for automatic proration
based upon the contingent events urged by the appellee, and may not
now be construed to contain such provisions."9 The court further
observed that "evaluating the agreement as a whole.., we conclude that
the parties did not contemplate proration upon the happening of the
contingent events urged by the appellee.""0 The opinion is further proof
that the appellate courts are committed to application of the rules of
construction to divorce agreements.
In Eickhoff v. Eickhoff," the parties entered into a settlement
agreement requiring the husband to pay retirement benefits to the wife
within one week after he received them. 2 The settlement agreement
was not incorporated into the divorce decree. The husband ceased
paying one-half of his gross pension and social security benefits to the
wife, and she brought an action to enforce the settlement agreement.
The husband answered and asserted the settlement agreement was void.
After the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, the trial
court held the settlement agreement imposed a valid contractual
obligation upon Mr. Eickhoff to pay Mrs. Eickhoff one-half of the gross
amount of his pension and social security benefits.'8 The supreme
court affirmed but held that Mrs. Eickhoff was entitled to summary
judgment only under a breach of contract theory. 4
B. Alimony
In Guntin v. Guntin,"5 the supreme court reversed the trial court and
held that a husband's alimony obligation, which was based upon his

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 163, 429 S.E.2d at 916.
Id.
Id.
Id.
10. Id. at 164, 429 S.E.2d at 917 (citation omitted).
11. 263 Ga. 498, 435 S.E.2d 914 (1993).
12. Id. at 498, 435 S.E.2d at 916.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 504, 435 S.E.2d at 920. The appellate court rejected theories of specific
performance, contempt and domestication and correction of the foreign divorce decree. Id.
at 502-03, 435 S.E.2d at 918-19.
15. 263 Ga. 241, 430 S.E.2d 6 (1993).
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salary, did not cease at his retirement.16 The court further held that
retirement benefits are "salary" within the meaning of his alimony
obligation.17 The court stated "though the retirement benefits are paid
to him after termination of employment, such benefits are part of the
consideration supporting the employment contract and are deferred
compensation for services rendered during the term of his employment." s Salary, however, did not include interest on savings, social
security benefits, and dividends from investments.19
C.

Enforcement
In Baer v. Baer,2' the husband counterclaimed for setoff in response
to the wife's application for contempt based on alimony and child support
arrearages.2 1 The supreme court initially restated the rule that a
counterclaim cannot be filed in response to an application for contempt.22 The supreme court then held that a setoff of the husband's
expenses that was not addressed in the divorce decree was not allowable
against alimony and child support because of the "unique nature of the
support obligation" in Georgia. 23 24The court found no equitable exceptions present that justified setoff.
Modification
In Honey v. Honey,25 the supreme court held that a divorce decree
entered before July 1, 1992 could not be modified under the provisions
of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") sections 19-6-15(e)
The supreme court considered whether a decree which
and (f).2

D.

16. Id. at 241, 430 S.E.2d at 6-7.
17. Id. at 242, 430 S.E.2d at 7.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 263 Ga. 574, 436 S.E.2d 6 (1993).
21. Id. at 574-75, 436 S.E.2d at 7.
22. Id. at 575, 436 S.E.2d at 7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 263 Ga. 722, 438 S.E.2d 87 (1994).
26. Id. at 722, 438 S.E.2d at 88. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(e) provides in part that
in any temporary or final order for child support with respect to any proceeding
for divorce, separate maintenance, legitimacy, or paternity entered on or after July
1, 1992, the trier of fact, in the exercise of sound discretion, may direct either or
both parents to provide financial assistance to a child who has not previously
married or become emancipated, who is enrolled in and attending a secondary
school and who has attained the age of majority before completing his or her
secondary school education, provided that such financial assistance shall not be
required after a child attains 20 years of age.
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provided that child support continue until the child turned eighteen
could be modified to require the parent to support the child until age
twenty.27 Since the divorce decree in question was entered
in 1987,
2
O.C.G.A. sections 19-6-15(e) and (f) as revised did not apply.
The divorce decree in Bunnell v. Rogers' provided that the husband's
child support obligation would increase yearly in direct proportion to the
increase in his gross wages from all employment sources during the
preceding twelve month period.' The trial court found the automatic
increase provision too vague and refused to enforce it. 1 The supreme
court disagreed and remanded the case to the trial court for the former
wife to "establish by evidence the amounts of income to which the
increase provision applies, whereupon she shall be entitled to judgment
for the arrearages established by calculations pursuant to the increase
provisions ....
In Thomas v. Whaley,3" the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
statutory rule prohibiting the filing of petitions to modify child support
more frequently than once every two years applies only to actions filed
in Georgia."
The former wife in Keeler v. Keeler 5 sought to modify the child
support award in a divorce decree. 6 The jury increased child support
from zero to $575 per month. The jury awarded less than the husband
offered in settlement negotiations." The trial court awarded attorney
fees to the ex-husband based on the argument that he was the prevailing
party pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 19-6-19(d).' Mr. Keeler contended
that since the jury award for child support was an amount less than the

O.C.GA. § 19-16-15(f) provides:

The provisions of subsection (e) of this code section shall be applicable only to a
temporary order or final decree for divorce, separate maintenance, legitimation,
or paternity entered on or after July 1, 1992, and the same shall be applicable to
an action for modification of a decree entered in such an action entered on or after
July 1, 1992, only upon a showing of a significant change of material circumstances.
27. 263 Ga. at 722, 438 S.E.2d at 88.
28. Id. at 722-23, 438 S.E,2d at 88.
29. 263 Ga. 811, 440 S.E.2d 12 (1994).

30. Id. at 812, 440 S.E.2d at 12.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 813, 440 S.E.2d at 13.
33. 208 Ga. App. 362, 430 S.E.2d 655 (1993).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 364, 430 S.E.2d at 657. See O.C.G.A § 19-6-19(a) (Supp. 1994).
263 Ga. 151, 430 S.E.2d 5 (1993).
Id. at 151, 430 S.E.2d at 5.
Id.
Id. at 151-52, 430 S.E.2d at 5.
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amount he had offered in settlement negotiations, that he was actually
the prevailing party. The supreme court held that the trier of fact
determines who is the prevailing party."' In this case, the former wife
prevailed because the jury increased child support, and the award of
attorney fees to the former husband was erroneous. 4°
E. Equitable Division
41
The equitable division portion of the jury award in Wagan v. Wagan
consisted of a $25,000 sum ostensibly held in escrow by Mr. Wagan's
attorney.42 The trial court directed Mr. Wagan "'to cause his attorney
.. n43
... to pay to [Mrs. Wagan] the sum of $25,000 held in escrow..
Mr. Wagan subsequently retained another attorney who demanded that
the original attorney deliver the $25,000 to Mrs. Wagan. However,
Mr. Wagan's original attorney apparently had converted the $25,000
before committing suicide. Mrs. Wagan moved to hold Mr. Wagan in
contempt and asked for clarification of the final divorce decree. The trial
court ordered Mr. Wagan to pay $25,000 to Mrs. Wagan within ten days
of the date of the court's order." Mr. Wagan appealed and the supreme
court held that the $25,000 was not alimony, but was a particular
$25,000 fund. 45 Since the fund no longer existed, there was nothing to
turn over to Mrs. Wagan.' The court's rationale was that "[aippellee's
failure to [receive] the $25,000 was not the result of appellant's willful
disobedience, but of the fiduciary's apparent misappropriation of the
fund."' 7 The court further stated that the jury's award was an in rem
judgment, which the trial court erroneously attempted to make an in
personam judgment.'

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 152, 430 S.E.2d at 5.
Id.
263 Ga. 376, 434 S.E.2d 475 (1993).
Id. at 376, 434 S.E.2d at 475.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 376-77, 434 S.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 376, 434 S.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 378, 434 S.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 378, 434 S.E.2d at 477.
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CHILDREN

Child Support

In Coxwell v. Matthews,49 the supreme court addressed the question
of whether birth and pregnancy-related medical expenses create a
support obligation the biological father can be ordered to pay." In
Coxwell, the birth mother, Matthews, filed a petition to establish
Coxwell's paternity of her son. She also sought $15,458.98 in pregnancy
and birth-related medical expenses. The parties entered into a consent
order resolving all issues except liability for birth-related expenses.51
The trial court found the mother was entitled to birth-related expenses
and ordered payment of these expenses by the father.52 The court of
appeals denied the father's application to appeal, but the supreme court
granted certiorari to determine whether pregnancy and birth-related
medical expenses incurred by the mother are recoverable from the father
in a paternity action." Citing O.C.G.A. section 19-7-24, 54 Justice
Clark held that such expenses are the obligation of the father and the
mother may recover them in a paternity action.5 5 Three justices
dissented, in effect, accusing the majority of judicial legislation." The
dissenters also noted the criminal abandonment statute specifically
57
imposed the duty that the majority grafted unto the paternity statute.
In Department of Human Resources v. Brandenburg' and Department of Human Resources v. Chappell," the court of appeals held that
the income deduction order requirement set forth in O.C.G.A. section 19-

49. 263 Ga. 444, 435 S.E.2d 33 (1993).
50. Id. at 445, 435 S.E.2d at 34.
51. Id. at 444, 435 S.E.2d at 33.
52. Id. at 444-45, 435 S.E.2d at 34.
53. Id. at 445, 435 S.E.2d at 34.
54. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-24 (1988) provides:
It is the joint and several duty of each parent of a child born out of wedlock to
provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of the child until he
reaches the age of majority, except to the extent that the duty of one parent is
otherwise or further defined by court order.
55. 263 Ga. at 446, 435 S.E.2d at 34.
56. 263 Ga. at 447-48, 435 S.E.2d at 35-36 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 447, 435 S.E.2d at 35-36.
58. 211 Ga. App. 715, 440 S.E.2d 498 (1994).
59. 211 Ga. App. 834, 440 S.E.2d 722 (1994).
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6-32(a)(1)6° is mandatory and that the trial court had erroneously
refused to enter income deduction orders."'
B.

Custody
The supreme court in Wilson v. Gouse62 held that the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA7) applies to all interstate custody
disputes regardless of whether a parent has abducted the child.6 The
PKPA is designed to ensure application of uniform guidelines in
determining jurisdiction in such cases." Applying PKPA standards to
the case before it, the supreme court agreed with the court of appeals
that Georgia had subject matter jurisdiction to modify an Ohio divorce
decree.6 A provision in the Ohio decree purporting to retain exclusive
and continuing jurisdiction over the children in this action was contrary
to the PKPA, 7 "and neither the PKPA nor the UCCJA ["Uniform Child
V6 permit subject matter jurisdiction to be
Custody Jurisdiction Act"]
conferred by stipulation, agreement, or consent of the parties."'
In the Interest of A.R.B., a child,70 is a strong judicial endorsement
of joint custody.7 This case involved an appeal from an award of sole
custody of the parties' only son to the mother. The father made an
application for discretionary appeal from the order of the juvenile
court.72 Justice Beasley, writing for the court of appeals, held that the
trial court failed to give proper consideration to the joint custody
provisions of O.C.G.A. section 19-9-6."3 The court of appeals remanded

60. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-32 (Supp. 1994).
61. Brandenburg,211 Ga. App. at 715, 440 S.E.2d at 499; Chappell, 211 Ga. App. at
834, 440 S.E.2d at 722-23.
62. 263 Ga. 887, 441 S.E.2d 57 (1994).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988).
64. 263 Ga. at 889, 441 S.E.2d at 59. The court of appeals found abduction necessary
to invoke the PKPA in Gouse v. Wilson, 207 Ga. App. 574, 428 S.E.2d 571 (1993). See
Barry McGough, Domestic Relations 45 MERCER L. REV. 215, 221 (1993) [hereinafter
aMcGough1.
65. Wilson, 263 Ga. at 890, 441 S.E.2d at 59-60. See McGough at 221. The PKPA thus
corrects the defects created by state modifications to the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA). O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -64 (1991).
66. Wilson, 263 Ga. at 895, 441 S.E.2d at 63.
67. Id. at 894-95, 441 S.E.2d at 63.
68. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -64 (1991).
69. Wilson, 263 Ga. at 895, 441 S.E.2d at 63.
70. 209 Ga. App. 324, 433 S.E.2d 411 (1993).
71. Id. Justice Beasley authored the opinion. Justice Cooper and Justice Murray
concurred in the judgment only.
72. Id. at 324, 433 S.E.2d at 412.
73. Id. at 326, 433 S.E.2d at 413-14.
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the case for the trial court to make findings and conclusions that give
effect to O.C.G.A. sections 19-9-3(d) and 19-9-6. 74 Justice Beasley
referred to the 1983 Georgia Constitution7" and emphasized that its
purpose was to "'promote the interest and happiness of the citizen and
of the family .

. ."'
'.

Justice Beasley stated that joint custody "af-

ford[s] greater equality between parents in fostering relationships with
their children so that the best interests of each child can be served."7
She referred to O.C.G.A. sections 19-7-2 and 19-9-6 and stated the policy
reasons favoring "equally shared parenting obligations and opportunities
which places children first in the constellation of individual desires
She also cited the 1990 amendment to O.C.G.A. section 19-9-

...

3(a) and its codification of shared parenting as it relates to custody of
minor children.79
The court dismissed the notion that joint physical custody as well as
The court observed that with
joint legal custody is untenable.'
cooperation the parties could make both joint physical custody and joint
legal custody a viable solution to divorce.81 In A.R.B., the evidence was
clear that both parents had been actively involved in the child's life,
providing emotional support to the child. The court stated:
[W1nherent in the express public policy is a recognition of the child's
right to equal access and opportunity with both parents, the right to be
guided and nurtured by both parents, the right to have major decisions
made by the application of both parents' wisdom, judgment and
experience. The child does not forfeit these rights when the parents
divorce. 2
The trial court changed custody in Templeman v. Earnest' because
the parents were "warring," the mother's income was different, and the
living conditions of the father were different as compared to the prior
actions." Moreover, the court awarded joint custody with physical
custody alternating annually because that was the parties' practice,

74. Id. at 327, 433 S.E.2d at 414.
75. GA. CoNsT. pmbl. (1983).
76. 209 Ga. App. at 326, 433 S.E.2d at 413.

77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 327, 433 S.E.2d at 414.
Id.
Id.
209 Ga. App. 557, 434 S.E.2d 106 (1993).
Id. at 557, 434 S.E.2d at 107.
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although not the court's preference. 5 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court because the circumstances did not meet the criteria for a
material change of condition." Moreover, the court struck down the
joint custody award because "[tihe trial court has an independent duty
in these cases to make an award of custody that is in the best interest
of the children ...and is not authorizedto merely ratify the practices of
87
the parties."
III.

LEGISLATION

The General Assembly amended the child support guidelines codified
in O.C.G.A. section 19-6-1588 to create a rebuttable presumption that
the support award amount is the correct amount.8 9 A written finding
or specific finding on the record is sufficient to rebut this presumption
if the finding states the support amount that would have been required
by the guidelines and justifies the variance."
The General Assembly also imposed an affimative duty on trial courts
to order the child support obligor to provide accident and sickness
insurance for minor children if available through the obligor's employment, unless it is cost prohibitive or available through the support
obligee. 9 If insurance coverage is unavailable or cost prohibitive, the
court may order the obligor to acquire insurance when it becomes
available, to pay the obligee's cost of insurance, or to pay for uncovered
expenses.9 2

85. Id.

86. Id. at 558, 434 S.E.2d at 107-08.
87. 209 Ga. App. at 558, 434 S.E.2d at 108 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).

88. O.C.GA. § 19-6-15 (Supp. 1994).
89. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(5).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 19-6-15(a).

92. Id.

